By Richard A. Watson;Thomas M. Lennon
Many sorts of Cartesian perspectives are handled through those papers: the perspectives that Descartes held, perspectives from our standpoint on these perspectives, perspectives on Descartes held through his early critics and fans, and perspectives which are Cartesian in outlook (not for not anything is Descartes nonetheless considered as the daddy of contemporary philosophy.) those overlapping perspectives give you the team spirit of this quantity, and mirror the solidarity of Richard A.Watson’s philosophical paintings. no longer least between Watson’s contributions has been his depiction of Cartesianism as a reaction to a collection of difficulties inside Descartes’s philosophy. The later Cartesians weren't slavish fans of Descartes. The individuals to this quantity could be seen as status to Watson because the Cartesians did to Descartes.
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Extra resources for Cartesian Views: Papers Presented to Richard A. Watson (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History)
Not only by this hope [of reward after death for their bondage], but also, and especially, by the fear that they may be 24 It is important to notice that Spinoza explicitly identiﬁes the “person” with an actually existing body and its correlative mind, at IIp13c. 25 Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 5. 26 See, for example, his preface to the Theological-Political Treatise. 29 punished horribly after death” (Vp41s: G II, 307/C 616).
No longer is it a matter of bringing together into a union two distinct substances. Rather, the unity is what is metaphysically prior. Mind and body are simply two distinct expressions, under diﬀerent attributes, Thought and Extension, of one and the same thing. As Spinoza says at IIp21s, The mind and the body are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. (G II, 109/C 467) metaphysic was meant to solve”; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 62–3.
22 Geulincx, Annotata ad metaphysicam, Opera II, 300. 23 But if even ‘being’ (or ‘entity’, ens) and ‘thing’ are, as Geulincx claims, ways or ‘forms’ (modi ) of thought, applied and aﬃxed to ‘things’ by the intellect, how can we truly discuss what we see and feel and what we think at all? Surely we can—and we must, Geulincx argues. We are bound to apply linguisitic categories and to keep applying them: things [as they are] in themselves are not things, or do not have that modus of our intellect by which they are given the status of ‘things’.