# Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3 (Determinables - Fuzzy by Donald M. Borchert

By Donald M. Borchert

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Additional info for Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3 (Determinables - Fuzzy Logic)

Example text

Kronz. ” In Language, Quantum, Music: Selected Contributed Papers of the Tenth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Florence, August 1995, edited by Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara, Roberto Giuntini, and Federico Laudisa. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1999. Hobbs, Jesse. ” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): 141–164. Stone, M. A. ” American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989): 123–131. There are a number of able discussions of problems for determinism in physical theories.

Can such an action be up to us? The answer given is that it can only be up to us if the lawlike connections and the first causal circumstance are within our control—which definitely they are not. Hence free actions cannot be effects of certain causal sequences but must be originated. Given the unbroken history of the philosophical debate on determinism and freedom until recently, must there be a presumption that either compatibilism or incompatibilism is true? Can that respectful attitude survive certain troublesome questions and alternatives?

To go along with Hume and suppose otherwise, he said, is to engage in no more than a little quibbling with words (Kant 1949). With these philosophers, there was already a kind of stalemate about determinism and freedom. Near the beginning of the twentieth century, it was taken as established, by some, that compatibilism was proved by a simple consideration. If a person acted freely on some occasion, it was true that the person could have acted otherwise. But, it was said, the latter means that the person would have acted differently if he or she had chosen differently, which is consistent with determinism (Moore 1912).