By John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd
We ordinarily imagine now we have unfastened will. yet how may possibly we have now loose will, if for whatever we do, it was once already actual within the far-off previous that we might do this factor? Or how might we've got unfastened will, if God already is familiar with upfront the entire information of our lives? Such concerns bring up the threat of "fatalism". This e-book collects 16 formerly released articles on fatalism, truths in regards to the destiny, and the connection among divine foreknowledge and human freedom, and encompasses a monstrous introductory essay and bibliography. the various items amassed the following construct bridges among discussions of human freedom and up to date advancements in different components of metaphysics, resembling philosophy of time. perfect for classes in unfastened will, metaphysics, and philosophy of faith, Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge will motivate vital new instructions in puzzling over loose will, time, and fact.
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Extra info for Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge
37 This is a possibility considered by Trenton Merricks (inspired by Jonathan Edwards) in his essay in this volume. For more on this topic, see Craig 1987, Anderson and Watson 2010, Byerly 2012, Byerly 2014, and Todd 2014. 36 30 Introduction consequence? These are deep questions proponents of fatalistic arguments seemingly must further address. 3. THE PROBLEM OF FUTU R E CONTINGENTS We turn now to the problem of future contingents. Future contingent propositions are propositions saying of contingent, presently undetermined events that they will happen.
Certainly someone sympathetic to Finch and Rea’s position might maintain that God’s prior belief is somehow “grounded in” one’s concrete future action, without also wishing to maintain that God’s prior belief is somehow extrinsic or relationally determined (that is, that the fact that God holds this belief at this time is a soft fact at or about this time). Whether this strategy can succeed depends on whether we can make sense of the idea that a current belief is “grounded in” a concrete future action.
There is no “possible world” in which both (1) it is true that one will perform some action and (2) one can refrain from performing that action. For in any world in which it is true that one will perform an action, God believes that you will perform it. And since you cannot so act that God would have been mistaken, you cannot do otherwise than perform it. One might attempt to ridicule proponents of this position by saying that “They think that prior truths are inconsistent with free will! ” What would be important to keep in mind, however, is that the proponent of this view is not thereby saddled with defending the logical fatalist’s argument.