Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2010: 13th by Alexandre Venelli (auth.), Kyung-Hyune Rhee, DaeHun Nyang

By Alexandre Venelli (auth.), Kyung-Hyune Rhee, DaeHun Nyang (eds.)

This booklet constitutes the completely refereed post-conference court cases of the thirteenth overseas convention on info safety and Cryptology, held in Seoul, Korea, in December 2010. The 28 revised complete papers awarded have been conscientiously chosen from ninety nine submissions in the course of rounds of reviewing. The convention offers a discussion board for the presentation of latest leads to study, improvement, and purposes within the box of knowledge safeguard and cryptology. The papers are equipped in topical sections on cryptanalysis, cryptographic algorithms, implementation, community and cellular defense, symmetric key cryptography, cryptographic protocols, and part channel attack.

Show description

Read Online or Download Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2010: 13th International Conference, Seoul, Korea, December 1-3, 2010, Revised Selected Papers PDF

Best security books

Information Security Fundamentals (2nd Edition)

Constructing a data defense software that clings to the primary of safeguard as a enterprise enabler needs to be step one in an enterprise’s attempt to construct a good defense software. Following within the footsteps of its bestselling predecessor, details safety basics, moment variation offers details safeguard pros with a transparent knowing of the basics of safety required to deal with the diversity of matters they're going to adventure within the box.

Firewalls For Dummies

What an awesome global we are living in! virtually whatever you could think could be researched, in comparison, in demand, studied, and in lots of circumstances, got, with the clicking of a mouse. the web has replaced our lives, placing an international of chance earlier than us. regrettably, it has additionally positioned an international of chance into the arms of these whose explanations are below honorable.

Security and Privacy Protection in Information Processing Systems

This publication constitutes the refereed court cases of the twenty eighth IFIP TC eleven overseas details safety and privateness convention, SEC 2013, held in Auckland, New Zealand, in July 2013. The 31 revised complete papers awarded have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from eighty three submissions. The papers are equipped in topical sections on malware, authentication and authorization, community security/cryptography, software program defense, coverage compliance and tasks, privateness security, probability research and defense metrics, social engineering, and safeguard management/forensics.

Additional info for Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2010: 13th International Conference, Seoul, Korea, December 1-3, 2010, Revised Selected Papers

Sample text

Summary of attacks on the ciphers examined in the paper. The “Encryptions” column gives the expected number of encriptions in the case of a SP cipher, while the “Lower bound” column – the expected number of encryptions required in the case of a random permutation. In case of n-bit Feistel cipher r is a number of covered rounds, and 2c is the complexity of some differential attack. 3 Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the openkey distinguishers and review techniques for constructing differential trails.

Nikoli´c et al. time the adversary is assumed to have a full control over the key. A chosen-key attack was launched on 8-round reduced AES-128 in [6]. Both the known-key and chosen-key distinguishers are collectively known open-key distinguishers. The adversary has the knowledge of the key or even can choose a value of the key. To succeed, the adversary has to discover some property of the attacked cipher that holds with a probability higher than for a random permutation. Differential distinguishers in the open-key model are defined in similar way as in the secret-key model.

The probability that a given input difference to the S-box will produce a given output difference. Note that when these differences are fixed, then the trail in the linear-diffusion layer holds with probability 1. The second type is a truncated differential trail [16]. In this trail only the position of the active bytes is important, while the actual difference values are ignored. Since, the S-box operates on a single byte, it means it cannot change an active byte to a non-active and vice-versa. Hence the adversary concentrates only on the linear-diffusion layer and finds the probability of a particular configuration of input-output active bytes.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.97 of 5 – based on 29 votes